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From a Pragmatist’s Point of View
George Herbert Mead’s Unattributed Review of Theodore Merz’s A
History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century
Ernest G. Rigney and Timothy C. Lundy
1 In the April, 1918 issue of the American Historical Review appeared an anonymous review of
Volume 4 of Theodore Merz’s magisterial A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth
Century. J. Franklin Jameson (1920: 13), the managing editor at the time, noted that book
reviewers  were  “[l]eft  free  to  sign  or  not  to  sign,  most  of  our  reviewers  sign  their
reviews.” Even though the review of  Merz was unsigned,  there is  sufficient evidence
regarding the review to aver that George Herbert Mead, a pragmatist philosopher from
the University of Chicago, was its author.1
2 The most direct means to establish Mead’s authorship is by examining several letters
germane to the published review. On the last day of 1917, Mead wrote his daughter-in-
law, Irene Tufts Mead, that he had completed his review of Merz: 
In the meantime you will be pleased to know that I have finished the review of
Merz. I no longer have [to] think rapidly of something else when I see the volume
and it can be placed by the side of its three predecessors, ceasing its mission of
reproval and reproach.
3 Mead’s letter was posted from Atlanta, Georgia, and Mead also mentioned that he was
unable to secure the services of a “public stenographer” to type the finished manuscript.2
4 Mead’s  fanciful  escape  from  “reproval  and  reproach”  was  short-lived,  however.  On
January 11, 1918, a one-page, chiding letter arrived in Chicago from the office of the
American Historical Review. The letter reminded Mead that his promised review of Merz
was overdue; Volume 4 had been mailed to him on February 9, 1917. Mead was requested
to submit his review before February 5, 1918. The letter concluded thusly:
We always wish that our reviews should come out in the earliest possible number
after  we  receive  the  book,  and  the  publishers  are  naturally  disappointed,  and
disposed to complain, if they do not. Please do your best to help us.3
5 In  a  January  15,  1918  letter  to  Irene,  Mead  again  referenced  Merz  when  he  dryly
commented on the length and somewhat turgid prose style of Merz’s Volume 4 – 827
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pages including introductory materials: “Having finished Merz, [I] have great confidence
that even [Trollope’s] The Warden can be completed”4.
6 In describing the process of selecting book reviewers, Jameson (1920: 12) said the Review
“sought the aid of the reviewer most qualified in respect to knowledge, judgment, and
fairness of mind.”5 Few scholars were more qualified in 1917 than Mead to review Merz’s
work. While at the University of Chicago, Mead taught a course titled, “Movements of
Thought in the Nineteenth Century” for twelve quarters.6 In other words, from 1898 to
1917,  Mead taught a course that  traversed the same intellectual  terrain described in
Merz’s four published volumes.7 
7 If Mead was knowledgeable about the subject matter, why did it take him an inordinate
period of time to finish his review? After all, as noted by Jameson (1920: 15), the American
Historical Review paid book reviewers for their contributions; consequently, reviewing a
book involved more of a formal contract (i.e., payment for work product) rather than an
informal or casual quid pro quo (i.e., “Write us an acceptable book review, and we will
publish it for you”).8 If Mead received Merz’s Volume 4 around mid- February of 1917,
then ten months elapsed before the review was completed and submitted. Why? Three
reasons can be adduced to explain this apparent lapse in professionalism by Mead. First,
the length of Merz’s volume combined with the fact that Mead had committed himself to
simultaneously  reviewing  two  other  books  would  have  slowed  his  rate  of  progress
considerably. At the same time Mead was to review Merz’s volume, he had agreed to
review a new translation of Wilhelm Wundt’s Folk Psychology, as well as Thorstein Veblen’s
recently published The Nature of Peace and the Terms of Its Perpetuation. By combining the
page-count for the three books,  it  can be seen that Mead had committed himself  to
reading  and comprehending 1.772  pages  of  often densely  footnoted text.  An equally
formidable task for Mead would have been organizing and writing three separate reviews.
Therefore, delays in completing the reviews were almost inevitable.
8 A second reason for the delay involved the death of Mead’s mother on March 25, 1917 –
his father had died in 1881. As noted by Cowles (1917: 75), Elizabeth Storrs Mead was the
former president of Mount Holyoke Seminary and College. When she died, the ailing Mrs.
Mead was residing at her daughter’s winter home in Florida. In addition to sharing their
mutual sorrow, Mead and his only sibling, Alice Mead Swing, were equally responsible for
settling their mother’s estate. All of the necessary arrangements attendant upon a death
and funeral would have consumed Mead’s immediate attention and energy.
9 A  final  reason  precluding  Mead’s  expeditious  completion  of  his review  was  an
international event that had significant ramifications for Mead and his immediate family.
The United States entered World War I on April 6, 1917. The most immediate effect of the
war upon Mead was to shift his scholarly priorities. Instead of focusing on book reviews,
Mead wrote five newspaper articles focusing on various war issues. These articles were
published  in  the  Chicago  Herald during  July  and  August  of  1917. 9 In  addition  to  the
newspaper  articles,  Mead prepared a  ten-page  pamphlet  addressing  the  issue  of  the
conscientious  objector  for  the  National  Security  League.10 On  a  more  personal  note,
America’s entry into the Great War worried Mead because his only child, Henry C. A.
Mead,  and his daughter-in-law,  Irene Tufts Mead,  were both actively participating in
different aspects of the war effort. Henry was training to serve with the army in France,
and Irene had already volunteered for an overseas assignment with the American Fund
for French Wounded (A.F.F.W.) – an organization that provided relief to wounded soldiers
in France during World War I.11
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*
10 While  the  above  factors  collectively  hindered  Mead’s  quick  completion  of  his  book
reviews,  they  did  not  stop  him.  His  reviews  of  the  Merz  and  Veblen  volumes  were
completed and published in 1918, while the Wundt review was published in 1919.12
11 Even if direct evidence were unavailable, a strong argument can be made on behalf of
Mead’s authorship solely based on the contents of the review. Reck (1964: lxxi) insisted
that Mead’s book reviews were significant because they furnished “valuable insights on
the development of Mead’s thought…” And, the Merz review is no exception, several ideas
unique to Mead are noticeably on display in the Merz review.
12 The historian J. G. Randall (1937: 535) noted that “the study of thought… goes to the core
of  the  historian’s  problem.”  Mead  had  taught  a  “history  of  thought”  course  at  the
University  of  Chicago  for  over  twenty  years.  Certainly,  Mead’s  preparations  for  and
revisions of that course provided him with the specialized knowledge needed to write the
anonymous review. Mead had perused Merz’s earlier volumes, and both scholars were
familiar with the work of the same nineteenth-century philosophers and scientists.  A
printed  version  of  Mead’s  course  was  posthumously  published  in  1936,  it  was
appropriately  titled  Movements  of  Thought  in  the  Nineteenth  Century.13 Although  Mead
neither wrote nor edited the material contained in this volume, the assembled contents
were based on a stenographic record of his lectures for the 1928 “history of thought”
course.14 Another record attesting to the content of Mead’s “history of thought” lectures
were notes taken by Irene Tufts Mead when she was a student in her future father-in-
law’s course during 1915.15 A much earlier version of the course was recorded in the 1891
class  notes  of  Eliza  Sunderland.  Sunderland’s  notes,  however,  were for  John Dewey’s
rendition of “Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century,” a philosophy course
taught by Dewey at the University of Michigan.16 Both Mead and Dewey taught at the
University of Michigan in 1891 and became close personal friends as well as colleagues.
Three  years  later,  in  1894,  both  scholars  accepted  positions  in  the  Department  of
Philosophy, Psychology, and Pedagogy at the University of Chicago. Consequently, with
three sets of lecture notes focused on the same topic, it should be possible to isolate and
identify any themes that were of particular importance to Mead.
13 Camic examined thematic changes among the three sets of lecture notes by comparing
notes from the 1891 (Dewey), 1915 (Mead), and 1928 (Mead) versions of the course. Three
themes,  according to Camic,  clearly distinguished Mead’s approach to the “history of
thought” from Dewey’s. More specifically, three themes that were either absent from or
muted in Dewey’s 1891 version of the course became noticeably salient in both the 1915
and  1928  iterations  presented  by  Mead.  The  three  themes  were:  first,  the  growing
significance of science as research-based activity; second, the failure of past efforts to
produce knowledge of the social world; and, third, the increasing importance of Darwin’s
view of evolution.17 Because Darwinian evolution was not a topic particularly relevant to
the anonymous review, it is omitted from the following discussion. However, the first and
second  themes  played  a  prominent  role  in  the  review’s  critique  of  Merz,  thereby
providing additional evidence that the reviewer was George Herbert Mead.
14 Mead’s review essay focused on the final, or fourth, volume of Merz’s History of European
Thought in the Nineteenth Century; however, Mead freely commented on all the volumes in
the series, from the initial volumes tracing the history of scientific thought to the final
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volumes examining the development of philosophic thought. Overall, Mead found Merz’s
volumes of “great value,” although Merz’s discussion of scientific thought was deemed of
greater interest and value than his survey of nineteenth-century philosophic thought.18
According to Mead (1918a: 622), even the volumes devoted to scientific thought “revealed
a philosophic attitude which affected” Merz’s tendency to overestimate “the value of
scientific  theory.” In Movements  of  Thought  in  the  Nineteenth Century, Mead (1936:  353)
contended that “the history of science since the Renaissance is really a history of the
research process.” And, as Mead (1918a: 622) argued in his review, “since science has
become  self-consciously  an  undertaking  of  research,  testing  its  progress  solely  by
experiments,  theory has  lost  that  value  which has  belonged to  it  in  philosophy and
religious dogma.” 
15 A specific  instance of  Merz’s  “philosophic  attitude”  toward theory was  found in  the
overemphasis he placed on the importance of the “energist’s theory” in contributing to
innovative research on the frontiers of scientific knowledge. Mead (1918a: 622) contested
Merz’s claim: 
The  theory  of  energy  springs  from  the  thermodynamic  laws,  themselves  the
outgrowth of the theory of the steam-engine, and has played little or no part in the
later investigations gathering about the structure of matter…19
16 Mead’s nexus of “steam engine,” “theory of energy,” and “thermodynamic laws” was a
unique and durable example that he often used in other writings. Mead relied on the
same example in his 1909 address at the Darwin Centenary, a commemoration held at the
University of  Chicago.20 The same example is  used in three different chapters of  the
published version of  Movements  of  Thought  in  the  Nineteenth  Century.21 Basically,  Mead
argued that philosophical theorizing about the doctrine of energy did not function as a
set of directions for understanding the steam engine. Conversely, an effort to understand
and measure the work output of the steam engine led to the formation of the energy
concept and the laws of thermodynamics. Moreover, both
[…]  the  physicist  and  the  chemist…  made  no  use  of  the  vision  given  in  the
mountains of the philosophy of energy.22
17 In Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Mead (1936: 144) insisted that
[…] the world is essentially a scientific world; and any philosophy which fails to
express, to make use of scientific method, is a philosophy that is out of place.23
18 Mead’s critique of the “energist’s theory” was distinctive. Other reviews that mentioned
Merz’s discussion of the energy doctrine characterized it as “remarkable for its lucidity”
(Johnston 1905: 422), or as “an admirable account of the development of the doctrine of
Energy [sic]” (Knott and Thomson 1905: 101).
19 From  Mead’s  (1918a:  622)  perspective,  scientific  theory  should  not  be  viewed  as  a
functional alternative to religious or philosophic dogma. As dogma, science would be
incapable of addressing new problems: 
[A]nd it is only in meeting new problems that modern science is alive[,] inevitably
new theory must arise.
20 Treated inappropriately as dogma, Mead (1918a: 622) continued, scientific theory became
a  permanently  fixed  and  final  terminus  ad  quem,  or  a  pre-existing  answer  to  every
conceivable question: “Finality in this field is neither a goal nor a desideratum.” Mead
(1936:  286)  concisely  expressed  the  same  sentiments  in  Movements  of  Thought  in  the
Nineteenth Century: “No statement that science makes is final.”
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21 Merz’s fascination with and high regard for grand theory was most noticeable in his
discussion  of  philosophic  doctrines,  according  to  Mead  (1918a:  623).  Scientific
achievements  during  the  nineteenth  century  had  generated  many  new  and  often
conflicting ideas. The challenge for philosophy was to develop a system of thought that
made sense out of these disparate ideas. For Merz, philosophy’s task was 
[…] to bring to systematic order the vast field of conflicting ideas which nineteenth
century research has opened up. (Mead 1918a: 623)
22 However,  instead  of  the  emergence  of  one  or  two  dominant  schools  of  thought,  a
bewildering  array  of  eclectic  philosophic  orientations  contended  for  momentary
supremacy. Without an all-encompassing philosophic doctrine, there was no 
[…] single comprehending structure where modern ideas may live at peace with one
another. (Mead 1918a: 623)
23 Mead noted that Merz’s preference for an all-encompassing system of thought explained
his  inordinately  lengthy  discussion  of  German idealism.  The  German idealists,  Mead
(1918a: 623) continued, erected
[…] the most imposing structures of the century, but thought has refused to abide
in them, and the historian of that thought must be willing to go with the uneasy
changing mind of the time, without backward and lingering glances at the imposing
but deserted dwellings which thought has abandoned.
24 Ultimately, Mead viewed Merz’s history of philosophic thought as a wistful lamentation
over  nineteenth-century  philosophers’  failure  to  develop  an  enduring  “single
comprehending structure” of thought.
25 Because of his philosophic biases, Merz overlooked at least one significant intellectual
development of  the nineteenth century:  “the advent  of  science in the field of  social
problems” (Mead 1918a: 623). Comte’s sociological version of positivism best exemplified 
[t]he urge of men toward the most intricate, the most difficult of problems, that of
society, and the demand that scientific method should be used here as it had been
used in physical nature. (Mead 1918a: 623)
26 Unfortunately,  Comte’s  insistence  that  a  scientific  approach be  used in  the  study of
society quickly fell into desuetude. As a consequence, the ideas of social theorists such as
Comte  and  Spencer  eventually  resembled  the  dogmatic  theories  developed  by  other
nineteenth-century philosophers. Nevertheless, Mead was confident that a social science
amenable to the requirements of modern research science was possible. Mead (1918a:
623-624)  suggested  that  the  use  of  scientific  methods  in  social  research would  yield
results immediately useful in addressing several philosophical problems:
Not  until  the  individual  and  the  social  group  from  which  he  arises  have  been
restated in scientific fashion will it be possible to approach again the meaning of
the problems of subjectivity and the objective world out of which man springs, with
his subjective experience.
27 In  another  essay,  Mead (1917b:  220)  similarly  claimed that  before  the empirical  link
between the  social  group and the  individual  could  be  properly  restated in  scientific
terms, other philosophically oriented problems needed to be solved; namely,
[…]  the  relation  of  the  psychical  [i.e.,  subjective]  and  the  physical  with  the
attendant problem of the meaning of the so-called origin of consciousness.
28 Mead postulated that “these problems must be attacked from the standpoint of the social
nature of so-called consciousness.”24
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29 Throughout Merz’s final volume, Mead (1918a: 624) found “expressions that belong to the
period when philosophy was the handmaid of theology.”25 Mead noted, however, that his
reservations  about  Merz’s  work  were  few  and  relatively  minor.  Mead  (1918a:  624)
concluded  his  review  by  describing  Merz’s  effort  as  “a  great  work,”  “a  valiant
undertaking” of immense “value to the student and the thinker who would orient himself
with reference to the thinkers of the past century.”
30 In summary, a close reading of the anonymous review yielded two overarching criticisms
of Merz. First, Merz paid scant attention to the research foundations of modern science.
Instead,  Merz  embraced the  all-encompassing,  abstract  explanations  characteristic  of
much nineteenth-century philosophy. Second, Merz was unaware of another tributary of
“thought” that first emerged during the nineteenth century. Merz never discussed the
incipient efforts to foster a scientific understanding of social existence.
31 As demonstrated in Movements of  Thought in the Nineteenth Century and other writings,
Mead was a tireless champion of the intelligent progress that resulted from a research-
centered science. In addition, the scientific project of utmost importance to Mead was a
careful scrutiny of the intricate relationship among the basic components of social life:
society,  self,  and  mind.  Succinctly,  ideas  that  the  anonymous  reviewer  identified  as
important but absent from Merz’s “history of European thought” were the same ideas
conspicuously present in Mead’s “movements of thought.”
32 A  content  analysis  of  the  anonymous  review  in  combination  with  the  documentary
evidence described earlier leads to only one conclusion: George H. Mead was indeed the
author of the unsigned review that appeared in the April,  1918 issue of the American
Historical Review.
*
33 What follows is George Herbert Mead’s review as it appeared in the American Historical
Review 23, no. 3 (April 1918), 622-624.26
34 A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century. By John Theodore Merz. Volume IV.
(Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons. 1914. Pp. xii, 825. 20 sh.)
35 The continuation of Merz’s history of philosophy in the nineteenth century – the fourth
volume of his History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century – completes the vast
survey of reflective thought whose first volumes presented the strides and revolutions in
scientific theory during the last century.
36 This treatment of philosophy has not equaled in interest or value his presentation of
scientific  doctrine.  In  the  latter  field  Merz  has  told  the  story  of  the  import  of  the
unprecedented advances of scientific research and discovery. It was a story as yet untold
in English. It had behind it his complete grip on scientific data and his sympathetic
comprehension  of  the  scientists’  undertaking  to  build  doctrines  adequate  to  the
achievement of their discoveries. Even here, however, Dr. Merz revealed a philosophic
attitude which affected his estimate of the value of scientific theory. The dominant place
he  awarded  to  the  energist’s  theory  indicated  that  the  universality  of  a  theory
overbalanced in his judgment its function on the frontiers of scientific research. The
theory of energy springs from the thermodynamic laws, themselves the outgrowth of the
theory of the steam-engine, and has played little or no part in the later investigations
gathering about the structure of matter, those investigations which have sprung from the
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recent study of electricity and radio-activity. Perhaps a similar indication of failure of
perspective  in  estimating  the  import  of  scientific  attitude  is  found  in  the  author’s
discussions of vitalism in the second volume of the history. This personal equation may
be stated as a failure to accept fully the scientist’s  attitude toward his theory.  Since
science  has  become self-consciously  an  undertaking  of  research,  testing  its  progress
solely by experiment, theory has lost that value which has belonged to it in philosophy
and  religious  dogma.  The  present  perfection  of  the  theory  and  the  spread  of  its
application give to it  in science no title to permanence. Theory in scientific research
serves  only  the  function  of  the  formulation  and  generalization  of  present  scientific
method.  With new problems – and it  is  only in meeting new problems that  modern
science is alive – inevitably new theory must arise. Finality in this field is neither a goal
nor a desideratum.
37 This attitude of Dr. Merz has but restricted importance in estimating the great value of
his first two volumes. The materials are so fully presented within text and foot-notes that
no one need fail to grasp the onward movement of organizing thought as it sought to
command the multitudinous results of investigations and experiments. It has, however, a
more serious aspect in the last two volumes, which deal with philosophic doctrine. Here
we find  the  same generous  recognition  of  all  the  thinkers  in  all  the  nations  whose
thought has played an essential part in the philosophy of the century. There is the same
exhaustive [623] familiarity with the enormous literature, the same determined effort to
comprehend,  and  the  same  freedom  of  vision  from  all  the  different  standpoints  of
different peoples and social classes and religious attitudes. But the temper is changed. In
the midst of the scientific achievements the enthusiasm of constant discovery inevitably
accompanies even the historian of swiftly changing scientific hypotheses. In the field of
philosophy the mind that seeks comprehension,  organization,  and finality gazes with
disappointment at the dismemberment of old systems, the early setting of the sun of
German romantic idealism, and the seeming incapacity of modern philosophic thought to
bring  to  systemic  order  the  vast  field  of  conflicting  ideas  which  nineteenth-century
discovery and research has opened up. The author assumes that systematic thinking must
accomplish this task, but it has yet to be done. The German idealists undertook it, and
their enthusiasm and daring for a while seemed adequate to the undertaking. But they
belong to the first third of the century, and their reappearing in English and American
neo-Hegelianism has  lived  as  short  a  life.  Nor  has  the  positivism of  Comte,  nor  the
phenomenalism of Mill, nor the agnostic philosophy of Spencer, been able to erect the
single comprehending structure where modern ideas may live at peace with each other.
Dr. Merz assumes that some other colossal minds must achieve what neither Hegel nor
Comte nor Mill  nor Spencer could achieve.  It  is  evident  that  such a  demand on the
historian’s part must affect his treatment of his material and his estimate of its value. It is
this frame of mind which explains the space given to the German idealists who strove to
accomplish  what  is  Dr.  Merz’s  conception  of  philosophy’s  task.  Not  only  are  these
thinkers presented once, but where their doctrines and spiritual influences are felt in
other fields the author rehearses their undertakings. In the actual number of pages they
occupy  three  times  the  space  that  should  be  accorded  them.  This  is  especially  true
because Dr. Merz is writing not a history of philosophic systems in these two volumes but
of nineteenth-century thought as it is evidenced in philosophy. They are indeed the most
imposing structures of the century, but thought has refused to abide in them, and the
historian of that thought must be willing to go with the uneasy changing mind of the
time, without backward and lingering glances at the imposing but deserted dwellings
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which thought has abandoned. For the same reason Dr. Merz has not sensed the import of
the advent of science in the field of social problems. Comte’s doctrine is also an imposing
structure, but this mighty dwelling-place never really housed other European thought
than his own. The structure was unimportant. The urge of men toward the most intricate,
the most difficult of problems, that of society, and the demand that scientific method
should be used here as it had been used in physical nature, was most significant. Perhaps
more than anything else this demand has been responsible for the breakdown of the
philosophic system-making, that Merz deplores. Not until the individual and the social
[624]  group from which he  arises  have  been restated in  scientific  fashion will  it  be
possible to approach again the meaning of the problems of subjectivity and the objective
world out of which man springs, with his subjective experience. It is this insistent social
problem  as  well  as  the  inroads  of  biology  into  psychology  that  lies  behind  the
uncertainties of mind and body. And this social problem finally is the form that religious
thought is slowly taking. In a word Dr. Merz has not succeeded in presenting the often
sunken obstacles against which philosophic speculation has split and the barriers that
have sent single streams of thought abroad into many channels. For his pen, thinking is
the domain of the observer, the contemplator, who if he fulfills the task of thought must
bring all within an ordered landscape. It is not the method by which men ceaselessly seek
solutions for their insistent changing problems.
*
38 This perhaps ungracious comment on a great work does not in any sense do justice to its
value to the student and the thinker who would orient himself with reference to the
thinkers of the past century. The full quotations, the always interesting foot-notes, the
continual cross-references, the sustained style, make this volume valuable as have been
those that preceded it, though the field has not the novelty in English which had that
which his first two volumes traversed. In spite of his announced purpose to write the
history of thought and not the history of philosophies, he has not been able to do more
than give a competent and sympathetic account of philosophic doctrines, with much that
is illuminating from the biographies of the philosophers. But though the determining
factors in the direction of the streams of thought have been largely changed by social
conditions, Dr. Merz has given his readers the resultants of these movements as they
have  crystallized  in  the  minds  of  individual  thinkers  rather  the  stream in its  living
course.
39 It is more readable than are the histories of modern philosophy. It does not in the fashion
of these treatises tease out the fibres [sic] of systematic doctrine, and it is comprehensive
and appreciative. To be sure at times one meets, with wonder, expressions that belong to
the period when philosophy was the handmaid of theology. For Merz materialism and
agnosticism may be dangerous at times. The literature of thought which lacks the Anglo-
Saxon restraint may be not only dangerous but evil. At the end of the chapters on the
Unity  of  Thought  and  the  Rationale  of  Thought  the  reader  feels  that  the  author  is
standing on the tower of an English cathedral looking for the philosophy that will again
save God, immortality, and the freedom of the will, that will so reshape the world of
science that the God of his fathers may return to it. And yet this is only a feeling Dr. Merz
leaves with his readers, a feeling that attaches to the author rather than his work. It is a
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valiant  undertaking  to  deal  justly  and  sympathetically  with  all  who  have  trod  the
speculative paths of his century.
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NOTES
1. “Sufficient evidence” encompasses both direct and indirect types of evidence. Direct evidence
refers to various documents supporting the claim that Mead was the author of the anonymous
review. Indirect evidence implies that the content of the published review exhibits certain ideas
or themes associated with Mead’s distinctive views of scientific activity and philosophy. Both
types of evidence will be used in establishing Mead as the putative author of the unsigned review.
According to Huebner (2014: 72-73, 265n27), Mead had previously published another “unsigned”
review in the July, 1900 issue of the American Historical Review. While the review was unsigned, the
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index to Volume 5 (1900) identified George H. Mead as its author. In contrast, George H. Mead’s
name does not appear in the index to Volume 23 (1918) of the American Historical Review.
2. University  of  Chicago  Library,  Special  Collections  Research  Center,  George  Herbert  Mead
Papers, box 1, folder 14, Letter from George H. Mead to Irene T. Mead, December 31, 1917.
3. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Manuscript Division, American Historical Association
Records, container no. 292, Editorial Correspondence 1918 K-Y, Letter from J. Franklin Jameson
to George H. Mead, January 11, 1918.
4. University  of  Chicago  Library,  Special  Collections  Research  Center,  George  Herbert  Mead
Papers, box 1, folder 15, Letter from George H. Mead to Irene T. Mead, January 15, 1918. The
Warden, published in  1855,  was  the  first  volume in  Anthony Trollope’s  six-volume Barchester
Towers cycle of novels.
5. Jameson served as the first managing editor of the American Historical Review from 1895 to 1901;
a second term as managing editor began in 1905 and ended in 1928. Between 1901 and 1905,
Jameson was a  faculty  member at  the University  of  Chicago.  In  that  capacity  he could have
known Mead personally, or at least known of Mead’s teaching and research interests. In addition,
the historian James Harvey Robinson was an associate editor of the American Historical Review
from 1912 to 1920. Robinson and Mead first met in 1890 while Mead was studying in Germany,
and both men sustained a mutual interest in each other’s scholarly activities throughout their
academic  careers.  University  of  Chicago Library,  Special  Collections  Research Center,  George
Herbert Mead Papers, box 1, folder 3, Letter from George H. Mead to Henry N. Castle, November
4, 1890. It is likely that Robinson recommended Mead as someone capable of intelligently
reviewing Merz’s fourth volume.
6. The frequency of this course offering was determined by consulting “Appendix 1:  Courses
Taught by Mead at the University of Chicago, 1894-95 to 1930-31,” in Lewis and Smith (1980:
262-271).
7. John Theodore Merz (1840-1922) was a polymath. Apparently, Merz was extraordinarily adept
as a philosopher, chemist, business executive, and historian. He was a German-British scholar
with a doctorate on Hegel. He was also an industrial chemist serving as the Vice-Chairman of
England’s Newcastle-on-Tyne Electric Supply Company,  which he founded in 1889.  Moreover,
Merz’s  A  History  of  European  Thought  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  was  an  exhaustive  survey  of
scientific (Volumes 1 and 2) and philosophical (Volumes 3 and 4) thought. The four volumes were
published between 1896 and 1914; and, according to Seidel (1998: 392), they represented “a 2.732-
page survey of intellectual development in Germany, France and Britain.” 
8. In the Review’s payment ledger for 1918 there is a receipt showing that on April 2, 1918, “G.H.
Meade”  was  paid  “$8.75”  for  his  “contribution  to  Apr.  1918  Rev.”  Library  of  Congress,
Washington,  D.C.,  Manuscript  Division,  American  Historical  Association  Records,  container
no. 372, receipt no. 20. It should be noted that an extra “e” was often mistakenly added to George
H. Mead’s surname, probably the result of confusing the American philosopher’s surname with
the surname of George Gordon Meade (1815-1872), a celebrated officer in the Union Army during
the American Civil War.
9. See Mead 1917c, 1917d, 1917e, 1917f, and 1917g.
10. See Mead 1917h. As described by Ward (1960, 53), the National Security League was founded
on December 1, 1914. The League focused on three primary concerns: the adequacy of America’s
war preparedness, educational initiatives to promote patriotism, and the nation’s commitment to
universal military training.
11. Concerning his son, George H. Mead’s trepidations were justified. Henry Mead was “seriously
wounded” on August 16, 1918 as he was “attempting to put out a fire in an ammunition dump.”
For his heroic actions, Henry was awarded a Citation (Silver) Star. “Chicago’s War Heroes,” The
Chicago Daily Tribune, October 2, 1918, 3.
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12. Regarding  the  Veblen  and  Wundt  reviews,  see  Mead  (1918b:  752-762)  and  Mead  (1919:
533-536) respectively.
13. See  Mead  1936.  Oelkers  (2004:  361n21)  attributed  Mead’s  “keen  historical  interests”  to
“Wilhelm Dilthey’s lectures on the ‘History of Philosophy,’ which he attended in Berlin in the
summer semester of 1891… Mead studied in Leipzig and Berlin from 1888 to 1891.”
14. Readers were assured by Moore (1936: vii-viii) that “all the notes utilized in the preparation
of this volume… may be regarded as verbatim recordings of Mr. Mead’s lectures.”
15. University  of  Chicago Library,  Special  Collections  Research Center,  George Herbert  Mead
Papers, box 14, folder 6, holograph notes taken by Irene T. Mead, “Movements of Thought in the
Nineteenth Century,” 1915, taught by George H. Mead, 69 p.
16. University of Michigan Digital Library, Bentley Historical Library, Eliza Jane Read Sunderland
Papers: 1865-1910, box 2, notebooks, “Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century,” 1891,
taught by John Dewey, 2 volumes. 
17. The above is a description of the methodological procedures developed and used by Camic,
and a truncated summary of the results of his research. See Camic (2013: 5-20).
18. Mead (1936: 251) characterized the two volumes that focused on scientific thought as “the
best statement that you can get of the development of science throughout this period…”
19. The same limitation of the energist perspective was conveyed in Irene T. Mead’s 1915 notes:
“But energists [were] not on [the] frontier of scientific research.” Irene T. Mead, box 14, folder 6,
“Holograph notes,” 38.
20. University  of  Chicago Library,  Special  Collections  Research Center,  George Herbert  Mead
Papers,  box  10,  folder  10,  George  H.  Mead,  “The  World  of  Thought  Before  and  After  the
Publication of the Origin of Species,” 1909, typescript, 5-9.
21. See Mead (1936: Chapters 8, 12, 13).
22. George H. Mead, box 10, folder 10, “The World of Thought,” 8.
23. According to Mead, pragmatism was the one school of philosophy that had “made use” of the
scientific method: “Pragmatism makes a system of philosophy out of [the] scientific method.” See
Irene T.  Mead,  box 14,  folder 6,  “Holograph notes,”  67;  also see George H.  Mead (1936:  354).
Mandelbaum (1965: 63) noted that the close connection between science and philosophy was the
“dominant  interpretative  theme”  of  Mead’s  Movements  of  Thought  in  the  Nineteenth  Century.
Moreover,  Mead (1936:  343)  insisted that  philosophy could interpret  scientific  results,  but  it
could neither replace them nor offer alternatives to them.
24. During  the  summer  of  1919,  Mead  began  working  on  what  became  an  unpublished
manuscript  of  thirty-six  typed  pages  –  subsequently,  the  manuscript  was  edited  into  three
supplementary  essays  (i.e.,  Ia,  II,  and  III)  that  were  published  in  Mead  1934.  Through  his
manuscript,  Mead  was  determined  to  resolve  some  of  the  difficulties  hindering  a  scientific
analysis of human conduct. Writing to his daughter-in-law in late July, Mead acknowledged that
several key ideas in the manuscript needed to be more rigorously clarified: “I have lived so long
with these ideas in their partially developed stages and with the realization of their great import
if they were developed that I am afraid of the process [of] working them out, but it has got to be
done” (University of Chicago Library, Special Collections Research Center, George Herbert Mead
Papers,  box 1,  folder 17,  Letter from George H.  Mead to Irene T.  Mead,  July 22,  1919).  More
specifically,  one  of  “the  problems  of  subjectivity”  was  that  the  concept  itself  needed  to  be
redefined. Subjectivity required a definition of the “private and psychical” that was not based on
a  solipsistic  view  of  “individual  experience”  –  that  is,  not  based  on  a  view  of  “individual
experience” as unique, singular, and ineffable. Mead (1934: 339) viewed subjectivity as a product
or consequence of social interaction: “[Insofar] as the individual is an object to himself in the
same sense  in  which  others  are  objects  to  him,  his  experiences  do  not  become private  and
psychical… [E]ven that which attaches to the experience of one individual as distinguished from
others is felt to represent a contribution which he makes to a common experience of all.” Mead’s
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reconceptualization was a radical break with the individualistic, consciousness-centered view of
human subjectivity prevalent in much of the philosophy and psychology of that time. Believing it
to be misguided, Mead rejected this conventional view. Instead, Mead and other pragmatists such
as  Dewey  claimed  that  the  interaction  that  took  place  between  human  beings  “precedes
subjectivity  and  is  constitutive  of  it”  (Biesta  1998:  74).  Consequently,  Mead  transformed
“subjectivity” into “reflective consciousness” (i.e., “the individual as object to himself”) and, as
Mead (1909: 407) noted in an earlier essay, “reflective consciousness implies a social situation
which has been its precondition.” In other words, reflective consciousness was not a “given,” not
a basic datum of human nature, but a consequence of social interaction.
25. Mead (1917a: 169-170) invoked the same phrase in his encomium for the philosopher Josiah
Royce. For Royce, “philosophy was no longer the handmaid of theology nor the textbook for a
formal  logic  and puritan  [sic]  ethics.”  During  the  medieval  period,  Scholastics  such as  Peter
Damian  (c. 1007-1073)  and  Thomas  Aquinas  (1225-1274)  characterized  philosophy  as  ancilla
theologiae (the handmaid of theology).
26. The  authors  gratefully  acknowledge  the  American  Historical  Review and Oxford University
Press  [ahr.oxfordjournals.org/content/23/3/622.full.pdf+html]  for  permission to  reprint  in  its
entirety George H. Mead’s review. 
ABSTRACTS
In  1914,  on  the  eve  of  the  Great  War,  the  eminent  scholar  and  polymath,  Theodore  Merz,
published  what  would  be  the  final  volume  of  his  magisterial  history  of  nineteenth-century
European thought.  A  belated  review of  this  volume appeared  in  the  April  1918  issue  of  the
American Historical Review. This particular review, though favorable, was inexplicably unsigned.
Our paper offers compelling evidence that the author of this unsigned review was George H.
Mead, the pragmatist philosopher from the University of Chicago. The paper is organized in the
following fashion. First, several types of documentary evidence are cited in support of the claim
that Mead authored the unsigned review. Second, content analysis is used to identify themes in
the review that reflect the distinctive intellectual concerns of Mead. One such concern was the
ability of research-based science to address and rectify problematic aspects of social life. The
concluding section of the paper reprints in its entirety Mead’s 1918 review.
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